Coal Dust Propagated UBB Explosion: MSHA

The fatal April 5 explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine started with a frictional ignition on the longwall face involving as little as 13 cubic feet of methane that would not normally be expected to cause such devastation, MSHA investigators believe from their analysis to date.

The ignition then “turned into a massive coal dust explosion,” according to coal mine safety and health administrator Kevin Stricklin. Ordinarily, a combination of “air flow, rock dusting, water sprays and quality examinations” would prevent such a combination of circumstances, Stricklin said.

MSHA chief Joe Main, Solicitor of Labor Patricia Smith, and Stricklin all spoke during a media conference call this morning. The event followed an in-person briefing held Tuesday evening for families of the 29 victims. Officials cautioned that their findings were not yet entirely definitive and the investigation is continuing.

Investigators found cutter bits on the longwall shear seriously worn and a number of water sprays inoperable, both conditions that MSHA believes could contribute to an ignition. The shear was cutting sandstone, which has sparking potential, at both the top and bottom of the coal, according to MSHA.

Reports called out from underground company examiners not long before the explosion indicated belt conveyors that needed to be rock dusted, officials said. The agency previously announced that some 80% of rock dust samples taken after the disaster were out of compliance with federal standards. Rock dusting is intended to inhibit suspended coal dust from propagating a coal mine explosion.

“At least two people” were in the neighborhood of the longwall shear, near the tailgate, at the time of the 70- to 90-second ignition, the federal officials stated. Those individuals areP> believed to have headed away from the ignition site and traveled about 400 to 600 feet, walking on the bases of the longwall shields toward the center portion of the longwall face, before the explosion overtook them. A total of six victims were found approximately mid-face by rescue teams.

At about the same time, a call may have been put in to the longwall headgate controls, where someone removed power from the longwall and at the same time disconnected the water sprays.

“We do not think [shutting off the water sprays] would be a good idea where an ignition is occurring,” Stricklin commented in response to questioning, but he stated, this was probably “normal protocol.”

No fire extinguishers were found in the area of the tailgate, Stricklin also stated in answer to a question from Mine Safety and Health News, nor are fire extinguishers required in that area. Other ignitions of similar magnitude in underground coal mines have been put out by miners wielding fire extinguishers and sometimes water hoses.

The agency hopes to produce further technical information on the cause of the explosion in about 60 to 90 days, “subject to review by any Department of Justice concerns,” Main stated. In an unusual situation, MSHA is deferring to a request the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia to delay promised public hearings or release of interview transcripts on the grounds that these actions could interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation. The U.S. Attorney gave no specifics on how greater openness by MSHA would interfere, according to Smith. No termination date for the request was estimated.

MSHA has conducted 161 interviews and another 18 persons have declined to participate and taken the Fifth Amendment, Main reported.

MSHA, Massey’s Freedom Energy Settle POV Injunction Case

In an unprecedented legal case, the Labor Dept. and Massey Energy’s Freedom Energy Mining Co. have reached a settlement where MSHA sought a court injunction on the “belief” of a pattern of violations.

Solicitor of Labor Patricia Smith said the “Labor Dept. is very excited by this settlement,” noting that most of the settlement provisions go “above and beyond the normal requirements contained in the Mine Act.”

For instance, under the settlement, Freedom is required to immediately abate any violation or hazard. There is no such thing as a ‘reasonable time’ for abatement. No work can be done until the violation is abated. A chief management officer of the mine has to be personally responsible to oversee operations and this person must counter-sign the exam books. “This is important because the person who can provide the resources to abate can immediately do so,” Smith said. MSHA can withdraw miners for any violation of a mandatory standard—not just for an alleged S&S violation.

If there is any violation involving equipment, MSHA is able to immediately shut down the equipment until the violation is abated.

If miners are withdrawn, Freedom must pay the miners up to one week, and if the mine remains closed after a week, then Massey must offer the miners work at one of 6 mines within a 60 mile driving distance from the mine. Smith said that there are 60-80 miners working at the mine, and that Massey has up to 300 positions available within this 60 mile radius should miners need work.

All requirements in the settlement agreement are subject to the court’s contempt proceedings.

MSHA-head Joe Main said the settlement “is an action that gives MSHA a different opportunity for enforcement.” He noted that there are some POV provisions, but primarily it gives MSHA greater authority to shut down a mine for conditions not deemed S&S.

When asked if there would be a continuing MSHA presence at the mine, Main and Smith noted that the company must tell MSHA in advance where it is working in the mine, so MSHA can use all resources effectively.

MSHA sought an injunction Nov. 3, and said the mine, located in Pike county, Ky., was “one accident away from tragedy.” (17 MSHN 496). Right after MSHA sought the injunction, Massey announced it would close the mine, due to the mine’s age and size.

Related Document

Agreed Order for Settlement (28K PDF)